



STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

Adequatio intellectus et rei

The Civilian Crisis Management Policy of the European Union in Afghanistan: Challenges for Police Mission

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Fact sheet

Fact sheet elements	EU declaratory policy objective
Objective – title	Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) / Civilian Crisis Management / Police Mission
Short explanation of the objective	“The Common Security and Defense Policy enables the European Union to take a leading role in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of the international security. It is an integral part of the EU's comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union has decided to develop the civilian aspects of crisis management in four priority areas: police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection. The European Union aims to be capable of carrying out any police operation, from advisory, assistance and training tasks to substituting to local police forces.” ¹
Source	http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/ http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afghanistan/index_en.htm

Fact sheet elements	EU operational policy action
Official title	EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGANISTAN)
Country / Headquarters	Afghanistan / Kabul
Head of Mission	Karl Ake Roghe
Objective(s)	“1) police command, control and communications; 2) intelligence-led policing; 3) criminal investigation department capacity building; 4) implementation of the anti-corruption strategy; 5) police-justice cooperation; 6)strengthening gender and Human rights aspects within the Afghan National Police” ²
Date/duration	from 15 June 2007 to 31 December 2014
Legal Basis	Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP of 30 May 2007 on establishment of the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan
Legal instrument(s)	Decisions of the Council of the EU and The Political and Security Committee; Joint Actions of the Council of the European Union; Agreements between EU and Afghanistan
Budget	108 million EUR (between 1 June 2013 and 31 December 2014)
Type of engagement(s)	Temporary mission (at central, regional and provincial levels)
EU Institutions/agencies involved	The Council of the EU; The Political and Security Committee
Non-EU Stakeholders involved	Canada
Member states contributions	24 EU Member States

¹ ‘Common Security and Defense Policy’, *European External Action Service*, retrieved 20.10.2013, <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/>.

² ‘EUPOL Afghanistan – Mission Description’, *European External Action Service*, retrieved 20.10.2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afghanistan/index_en.htm.

INTRODUCTION

The one of the directions of the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy is the civilian crisis management, which allows EU to enhance its civilian capacity in the third countries, thus by promoting peace and international security on the international level. In this regard, EU deployed its civilian police mission across the world's most fragile regions where there is a necessity to deal with the civilian matters during post-conflict era. EU Police Mission is one of the instruments of the civilian dimension of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy. The questions is 'to what extent is the EU declaratory foreign policy objective supported through operational policy?'. In this paper, I will argue that civilian crisis management policy of EU is symbolic rather than substantial. Because, EU spends immense amount of money for maintaining and maintenance of its police forces without having solid strategy for that mission and with a limited awareness about local issues and people. The context of paper will be analyzed under *Background, EU Police Mission in Afghanistan, Challenges EUPOL faces in Afghanistan* titles and final remarks on the essence of the coherence between EU's police mission and declaratory policy will be given in *Conclusion*.

BACKGROUND

Following the collapse of British Empire, Afghanistan remained in the focus of interests of regional states such as Russia, Iran, India and Pakistan, while Taliban insurgency remains as a main concern of country. Local government really need EU's civilian assistance in order to strengthen the provincial administrations, to harmonize local governance and to deliver public services.³ The US and NATO's military intervention in Afghanistan could not solve Afghan insurgency problem and left current government more dependent on external military forces for security provision in the country and poses problems for EU's civil mission and common foreign policy efforts which damaging EU's reputation and credibility as a partner in and out Europe.⁴ Although, there is an explicit necessity for strong cooperation between EU Member States and EU institutions (Commission and the Council) in the areas of policing and rule of law, this fact is ignored by Member States so far.⁵

EU POLICE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

The EU Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL) has been established in 2007 by replacing Germany for civilian police assistance. "EUPOL's mission was to monitor and advise the Afghans on establishing a

³ D. Korski, *Afghanistan: Europe's Forgotten War*, European Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin, 2008, p.3, retrieved 02.11.2013, http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/afghanistan_report.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.7-8.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p.12.

civilian law enforcement organization rather than to directly train Afghan police personnel.”⁶ “The mission aims at contributing to the establishment of sustainable and effective civilian police arrangements under Afghan authority in accordance with international standards.”⁷

Police missions is one of the important four civilian missions of the EU. Afghan government did not have civilian police forces for many years. “Since 1747, the Afghan state has never developed a modern, capable police force. Historically, the police had a limited role, especially in tribal and remote rural areas.”⁸ Then-existed police forces were the untrained and illiterate quasi-military forces, which were subjected to military commanders, but not the state. The Afghan society considered Afghan police as coercive force of the state rather than a civilian one. Therefore, EU police mission faced many problems, particularly when it came to reforms, institutional structures and training procedures.⁹

Thus far, EUPOL developed number of training programs and trained thousands Afghan national police officers and inspectors (as well as international and local staff) within the Ministry of Interior, in areas of criminal investigation, anti-corruption etc.; improved policing standards by enhancing cooperation between police, investigators and prosecutors; established the Office of the Police Ombudsman and a Department of Human Right and Gender at the Police Academy. The ultimate goal is to improve public trust in the Afghan justice system.¹⁰

CHALLENGES EUPOL FACES IN AFGHANISTAN

The EUPOL Afghanistan’s performance can be seem successful in factsheets only. The EU is facing numerous problems in regards to implementation of its crisis management policy:

⁶ R.M. Perito, *Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform*, The Special Report of the United States Institute of Peace, 2009, p.10, retrieved 02.11.2013, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_police.pdf.

⁷ M. Kuhn, *The System of EU Crisis Management - From Bringing Peace to Establishing Democracy?*, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol 13, 2009, p.251, retrieved 02.11.2013, http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf2/mpunyb_07_kuhn.pdf.

⁸ ‘Policing Inteqal: Next Steps in Police Reform in Afghanistan’, Final Report of *British Army Afghan COIN Centre*, UK, 2010, p.12, retrieved 02.11.2013, http://www.coffey.com/Uploads/Documents/Policing-Inteqal--Next-Steps-in-Police-Reform-in-Afghanistan_20120712153914.pdf.

⁹ G. Gaylord, *EU Involvement in the Afghanistan War: Progress toward a Viable EU Foreign and Security Policy*, Washington Research Library Consortium, 2011, pp.36-37, retrieved 02.11.2013, <http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/handle/1961/10026>.

¹⁰ ‘European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN)’, Factsheet, *Ministry of Interior Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*, Afghanistan, 2011, p.2, <http://moi.gov.af/Content/files/eupol-eng-factsheet.pdf>.

- The EU does not have capability to carry out large-scaled autonomous operations. In this context, EU has to rely on the support and capability of NATO. From the other side, non-EU member states like Turkey may have an influence on EU's decision-making. For instance, Turkey delayed the deployment of EUPOL Afghanistan by using its veto right in NATO.¹¹

- The EU made a mistake by working with the existing police structures of Afghanistan. There is a lack of local knowledge for international community and language difference, and decision-making for Afghanistan have been taken on basis of intelligence information so far, which is not sufficient. Moreover, the number of international police in Afghanistan is too small to be effective and under the military-to-population ratios in comparison with other civilian mission.¹² e.g. the EU deployed ten times more police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo rather than Afghanistan, though Kosovo is like a small province of Afghanistan.¹³

- In 2009, EU faced with new challenges after creation of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan. NATO offered to protect EUPOL staff, but within its military command structure. Because, the scope of EU police mission requires an immense amount of resources that any single allied force could not do alone.¹⁴

- The problems of deficiency of police officers, judicial staff and civilian experts should not be underestimated. Moreover, CSDP is not the first priority for the most member states, which paid lip service to civilian missions so far.¹⁵

- There are sure practical problems, such illiteracy of police officers (70%) which create difficulties in reading of instructions, maps, number plates and serial number of gun, writing reports, keeping records and notes, understanding of context of educational trainings and some trained police officers leave the service after their training.¹⁶

¹¹ Kuhn, *op.cit.*, p.260.

¹² Korsi, *op.cit.*, pp.5-13.

¹³ J. Ladzik, *EU military and civilian crisis management operations: the first six years*, European Policy Brief, The Global Policy Institute, London, 2009, p.5, retrieved 02.11.2013, http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/filepool/Crisis_Management_Policy_Brief.pdf.

¹⁴ Perito, *op.cit.*, pp.10-11.

¹⁵ A. Jacobs, *EU Civilian Crisis Management: A Crisis in the Making?*, CSS Analysis in Security Policy, 2011, pp.1-3, retrieved 02.11.2013, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=126428>.

¹⁶ 'The EU's Afghan Police Mission', 8th Report of Session 2010-2011, *European Union Committee of the House of Lords*, London, 2011, p.17, retrieved 02.11.2013, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldcom/87/87.pdf>.

- Without provision of secure environment and reduction of insurgency that hinders successful implementation of mission, EUPOL's initiatives will not be fruitful¹⁷ and though monthly wages of police officers were raised, they prefer to work for Taliban and mujahidin for relatively higher wages.¹⁸
- Lack of confidence in local people for EUPOL, insufficient capacity and resources, corruption, lack of female recruits and ethic balance.¹⁹

CONCLUSION

The above-mentioned challenges demonstrates EU's incapability and lack of concrete strategy for entire Afghan police system. A huge budget allocation for civilian police mission without learning country, people, culture and mental aspects well is nothing more than throwing money to air in desert. Therefore, EUPOL contribution to Afghan police service is not substantial, but rather symbolic and challenges does not make EU strong player in Afghanistan.

EUPOL's current performance shows that EU works on structural framework of police mission and EUPOL acts as an advisory institutions rather than executive. Because of lack of coordination and unwillingness of member states to enhance their civilian presence in Afghanistan, limited collaboration among EU member states and EU institutions, the mission cannot be effective and the Union's impact is limited.

To sum up, EU operational policy in Afghanistan supports its declaratory foreign policy objective in structural and bureaucratic way. Since 2007 so far, the EU tried to consolidate its operational policy by new agreements with Afghan government, new amendment to Council Decisions, extending the mandate of EU Special Representative in Afghanistan. Given the fact that, EU Police Mission ends on late December of 2014, the date when NATO troops also planning totally to withdraw from country, there will be new power vacuum in Afghanistan both in civilian and military arena. After withdrawal of NATO troops, the alliance is planning to maintain its presence on advisory level, which takes over EUPOL's current role.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.34

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.46

¹⁹ European Commission, 'The Police, Humanitarians and the Protection of Civilians: Coordinating 'Civilian' Contributions', *Summary note of the HPG/ECHO Roundtable on Civil-Military Coordination*, 2012, Brussels, p.4, retrieved 02.11.2013, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/news/20120507_hpg_summary_note_roundtable_en.pdf.

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